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The construction of a national
Maori identity by Maori media
This article discusses the Maori construction of a national Maori
identity by the Maori media, and by Maori radio in particular. It then
suggests that this is creating a Maori nation within the state of New
Zealand. This is an important development for Maori and for the
future of New Zealand society. The article suggests that Maori are
creating a fully developed identity as required by the radical demo-
cratic theories of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and, as such,
will provide a practical case study of their theories.
IAN STUART
Te Manga Maori, Eastern Institute of Technology
Articles
ABSTRACT
DURING the past 15 or so years Maori have taken the mass media and areusing it for their own ends. However the form of mass media Maori are
using is not the Western model, but rather an adapted Developmental Media
model.  The creation of the Maori media as a developmental media was not a
conscious choice, but rather the natural outcome of the stated aims of the Maori
media, to promote te reo and tikanga Maori (Maori language and culture). This
is in marked contrast to the mainstream media, whose usual aims are purely
commercial, either in terms of providing entertainment or information and
thereby creating an audience which can be sold to advertisers.
Now, the presence of a developmental media within a Western, free-market
and democratic state, presents a near unique opportunity for study, firstly, of the
Maori media itself,  secondly, of the impact a Maori mass media will have on
its culture and society, and thirdly, of the impact the Maori media will have on
wider New Zealand.  This article suggests that one area, the construction of
Maori identity, will prove a fruitful area for such study. As such, it reaches no
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definite conclusions, but considers what has happened to Maori identity and the
Maori media so far and suggests avenues of future development and further
study. It looks at the development of a Maori identity in general terms, and then
considers the social effects of a completely Maori identity in terms of the
theories of Bourdieu and the left-wing discourse theories of Laclau and Mouffe.
It argues that, by creating their own identity Maori will force New Zealand to
become the radical plural democracy envisioned by Laclau and Mouffe.
This article focuses on the development of a Maori identity largely in terms
of Maori radio, as the major national Maori media, but makes references to print
media sources.
Developmental media
The Maori media falls into the developmental media category because of its
generally accepted objectives — to promote the Maori language and culture.
The Maori media seeks to educate people to ensure the survival of both the
language and culture. The Maori media also actively seeks to promote positive
images of Maori and to provide a Maori view of events and news, all roles
assumed by a developmental media. The Maori media took on these roles
because of a Maori perception, based on experience in present-day New
Zealand, that these roles are not adequately performed by the mainstream media.
In showing the characteristics of a developmental media and how the Maori
mass media conforms to that classification, the work of Robie (1994; 1995) is
significant. Robie focuses specifically on the news media and news values.
Robie’s schema can be extended beyond the news values and into the objectives
of the developmental media as a whole. This is characteristic of the Maori media
which not only applies these values to the news, but to its entertainment
programme, talk-back and other shows. The values are portrayed in the music
Maori radio plays, in the announcers’ words and in the overall impressions
created.
In the field of developmental news media Robie divides the news media into
Four Worlds, a First World — essentially the Western — in which the media
practises ‘objectivity’; a Second World — the communist world — in which the
news media is a ‘collective agitator’ promoting information with ideological
significance; the Third World — the traditional third world — in which the news
media serves a ‘nation-building’ role, where news is development; and the
Fourth World — the still colonised nations and countries with indigenous first
nation minorities — where the news media serves the cause of
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‘self-determination’.
While Aotearoa/New Zealand may be considered part of the first world, for
Maori it is part of the Fourth World as the European colonisers are still present
and holding dominant power. This means the majority of Maori media are
working with the values of the Fourth World media, though also expressing the
values of the other three worlds.
Robie’s schema, therefore, can well describe the values of the developmen-
tal media in post-colonial countries. However a slight rework is necessary to
adequately describe the Maori media in these terms. To Robie the collective
agitator of the Second World is ideologically significant and politically correct
—eg. the news of the Communist Party. In Aotearoa/New Zealand the Maori
media does not support a political party, but it does have an ideology.
Here I want to use ideology as defined by the neo-Gramscian discourse
theory of Laclau and Mouffe, where ideology is a way of ordering the world, a
type of ontological category. In this sense, the ideology of the Maori media can
be expressed is basic terms as the validity of the Maori worldview, expressed
through te reo Maori and tikanga Maori. It is not the purpose of this article to
define the ideology, nor is it necessary.
Robie’s concept of the Third World news media — using values of
‘development’ matches some Maori media approaches, which can be seen in
stories of iwi and hapu development projects, in individual success stories and
in the use of Maori role models to provide positive images of Maori. It would
seem to be difficult for the Maori media to promote the Third World value of
nation-building within an already developed country. In this case the Maori
media is building, or rebuilding, a culture, and by doing so, I will argue, is
creating a nation, but a nation separated from a state, and internal within a state.
Robie categorises the Fourth World values as ‘self-determination’, with the
sub-headings Language, Culture and Development. An examination shows the
Maori media generally defines its role in terms of language revival, cultural
survival and to promote key issues, notably Tino Rangatiratanga, thus clearly
covering this category.
Looking at specific Maori media alongside these categories, newspapers
such as Kahungunu were clear examples of collective agitators, Mana magazine
fits best into the Third World categories, while Kia Hiwa Ra and Te Maori News
fits mainly into the Third and Fourth World categories. But as Robie says,
individual media do not necessarily fit into a single category and the categories
often overlap (1994: 72). Maori radio and television stations tend to move across
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all four categories, depending on their programming and the kaupapa of the
programme makers.
Nation-building
In this article I wish to focus on the Maori media as it is involved in nation-
building, essentially a function of Robie’s Fourth World media. An essential
part of nation-building, in the modern sense in which a nation is separate from
a state, is the creation of a cultural identity.
The concept of a nation I wish to use is best summarised by Manuel Castells
(1997: 27-32) who distinguishes ‘the nation’ as separate from ‘the state’. In this
sense the nation is a group of people who share a collective identity, centred on
language and culture, rather than territorial groupings within a geographic
location bounded by recognised borders. A nation can, therefore, be described
as an ethnic and cultural identity. In contrast the state is a political power on the
regional and international stage, exercising internal power over a defined
territory, and defending that territory against invaders, using its apparatus — the
police, army, and bureaucracies — to exercise this power.
Historically, the 19th century iwi can be defined as Maori nation-states
(Ballara, 1998).  Each iwi had a separate identity, based primarily on whakapapa
(identity based on descent lines), but also displaying some differences in
language and cultural practice. Political organisation within each area differed,
from tightly controlled groups with strong ariki lines, to loosely arranged groups
relying on whakapapa ties rather than unified and organised political or power
structures and enforcement agencies. But each iwi/nation-state had control over
a territory and defended it from invaders. Each iwi was not a nation on the
international stage, as Castells describes and as we understand the international
stage today, because each iwi only had relations with other iwi, i.e. within the
geographical location of New Zealand. But those relationships can be consid-
ered international in the strictest sense — because the relations were between-
nations.
In this period identity was based on membership of iwi and hapu with the
binary opposites of ‘us’ and the  ‘other’. The ‘us’ was the iwi or hapu (depending
on circumstances) and the ‘other’ was other iwi or other hapu. With the arrival
of the Europeans a new identity was needed. The ‘other’ were the white-
skinned, technologically advanced, mainly English-speaking, European arriv-
als and, therefore, the ‘us’ were the indigenous people of Aotearoa/New
Zealand. The ‘us’ became Maori and the ‘other’  — Pakeha. At this point the
PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 9 2003 49
IRAQ AND THE MEDIA WAR
cultural identities were defined by each group, but in relation to each other. Each
iwi had its own cultural identity, though major elements were shared with other
iwi, while the arriving Europeans had their identity, usually from the British
Isles. The important point is that each group largely controlled its own identity,
as much as any groups controls its identity in the face of a ‘them’.
Following the European arrival and the Treaty of Waitangi, the settler
Government, with its policies of warfare and confiscation, and even genocide,
followed by an assimilation policy, deliberately set out to destroy the Maori
nation-states. One Maori reaction to this was the attempt to create a modern
Maori pan-tribal nation-state with the Kingitanga, summarised by Belich as an
alternative Government exercising control over a territory and exercising
military power externally (defending its territory) (Belich, 1998: 78-80). These
are basic requirements which define a nation-state. However, the settler govern-
ment’s military aggression during the latter half of the 19th century destroyed
the Kingitanga as an effective nation-state. Similar fates befell other Maori
political responses to colonisation.
After the New Zealand Wars, the assimilation policies of the settler
Government destroyed the possibility of iwi becoming ‘nations’ as well, even
going so far as to nearly destroy Maori identity, in a drive to create what have
become known, derogatorily, as ‘brown-skinned Pakeha’.
During the first half of the 20th century Maori identity was based on
constructs of the anthropologists and ethnographers, sociologists and other
writers of Maori history, society and culture. These writers were almost always
Pakeha. And by the middle of the 20th century Maori identity, in terms of
cultural characteristics was defined by the mass media.  Maori identity was
therefore largely constructed and defined by the immigrant colonisers — the
Pakeha.
The Maori renaissance of the latter quarter of the 20th century attempted to
re-establish a Maori identity. But, recognising that the existing ‘Maori’ identity
was a construct of the colonising society, rather than of Maori themselves, the
renaissance voices reverted to identities based on the Maori-constructed iwi.
The more radical voices of this period refused to be labelled ‘Maori’ admitting
only to an iwi-based identity, wishing to be known as Tuhoe,or Kahungunu, or
Te Aupouri, or Te Ati Awa.
The seeds of the new Maori nation were sown in the late 1960s and grew in
the 1970s, with major focal events such as Dame Whena Cooper’s land march,
which was for all Maori land, not one iwi; movements such as Nga Tama Toa,
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which claimed to speak on behalf of all young Maori; and liberal Pakeha
political initiatives such as the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal. The
establishment of the tribunal was significant. Firstly, it brought injustices to the
fore of Maori public consciousness and, secondly, it united groups around
claims.
The political aspects of the renaissance moved further in the 1980s with
Donna Awatere’s articles in Broadsheet (Awatere, 1982; 1983) on Maori
sovereignty — not iwi sovereignty — which crystallised many ideas and lead
to a national debate that eventually became calls for the restoration of Tino
Rangatiratanga for all Maori. The important idea here, as in all these examples,
is that the radical voices are demanding changes for all Maori, not just their own
whakapapa/kin groups. The speakers must have some conception of the group
they claim to speak for, and possibly some recognition by that group that they
are legitimate speakers. This means the group must have a common identity —
a consciousness of individuals constituting a group.
In the past this group consciousness has been forced on Maori because of
physical differences — brown skin, dark hair, facial features — alongside
Pakeha-defined cultural characteristics: the positive stereotypes of a happy,
jovial, hard-working, friendly, laid-back people and the negative stereotypes of
drug-using domestically violent welfare-dependent criminals. In both cases
these stereotypes have been created by the Pakeha majority — a majority ‘us’
— which constructed Maori as a ‘them’, excluding Maori from mainstream
New Zealand.  This led most Maori to refuse the identity of ‘New Zealanders’
or ‘Kiwi’, because both identities are defined by the dominant Pakeha culture.
Instead they have identified as ‘Maori’ even though that was more likely an
identity based on negatives.
These negatives were re-enforced by the mainstream media in what Walker
calls ‘a periodic recitation of Maori failings’ (Walker, 1989: 43). This annual
recitation consists of news stories about  poor achievement in education, poor
health, high crime rates, mental health, prison populations, unemployment and
so on.
Re-emerging Maori media
This negative portrayal of Maori, and the accompanying construction of Maori
identities were factors which motivated Maori to re-establish their own media.
The Maori renaissance has seen the growth of a new generation of Maori voices
— politically aware and willing to use the political and cultural tools of the
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dominant culture to achieve their own ends. However, it is important to
recognise that these new voices were previously only able to speak to Maoridom
through the Pakeha-controlled mainstream media. The mainstream media
distorted the message by interpreting it and filtering it through Pakeha eyes —
in effect adding radicalism to the long list of Maori negatives.  Awatere’s Maori
sovereignty articles were published in Broadsheet, which meant that it was
largely printed as it was written and not mediated through the mainstream media
filters. But Broadsheet was the vehicle of the white feminist movement, and
therefore Awatere’s thoughts and ideas did not reach a wide Maori audience, or
even a wide Pakeha audience.
The proponents of a Maori media, especially Maori radio, did not see them
as overt political vehicles.  Rather they were vehicles for cultural reproduction
— promoting Te Reo and Tikanga Maori. However, given the nature of news
and current affairs programming, Maori radio had to address political issues and
thus become political itself, at least in terms of providing a forum for political
voices. But establishing a Maori media itself is a political act and the denial of
the possibility of objectivity has allowed the Maori media to be overtly political
in print and across the airwaves.
The advent of Te Karere, a Maori news service on Television New Zealand,
was symbolically important in that it provided a visible Maori voice and a visible
Maori media identity, and therefore a public focal point for Maoridom. While
Te Karere’s symbolic significance can not be under-estimated, it was in te reo
Maori, (at Te Karere’s inception minority language even among Maori) and
therefore its importance as a mass information service was negligible. It’s
importance as an information service grows, however, as more people learn te
reo Maori.
It was not until the late 1980s, with the growth of the bilingual Maori
newspapers and radio stations, that Maori political leaders and thinkers were
able to speak to Maori through their own channels. Because it was bilingual,
Maori radio, as a true mass information service, now plays a major role, if not
a dominant role, in establishing a new Maori nation.
Firstly, on television Te Karere, and the cultural programmes Wakahuia
and Marae, present Maori views of news, politics and culture to a Maori
audience. The culture portrayed may well be based in the iwi and hapu but it is
broadcast to all Maori. The news and politics is broadcast nationwide, allowing
Maori voices and opinions to be heard by a wide audience. Like the rest of the
population the aural and visual medium of television offers Maori an easily
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accessible information service. But the Aotearoa Television Network has been
and gone and, at the time of writing, the new Maori television network has yet
to go to air, so Maori radio now provides the major Maori media information
sources, especially since the demise of the iwi newspapers.
The national magazines and newspapers such as Te Maori News provide
political  opinions to all Maori. And Mana magazine provides national news as
well as cultural issues. Mana identifies people by iwi and hapu and yet holds up
‘Maori’ role models, rather than iwi role models. Developments and positive
images are of people as Maori, rather than people as iwi members, though iwi
membership is not neglected. This is a consequence of their position as  national
Maori magazines and newspapers, rather than the iwi-based newspapers of the
1980s and 1990s.
The Maori newspapers were largely iwi-based, providing a voice for their
communities. The exceptions, Te Maori News and Kia Hiwa Ra (funded by
Maniapoto but aiming to be a national paper) provided broader news and issues
while the iwi papers provided a voice for political activists and thinkers based
in their own iwi and commenting on regional issues from the iwi/hapu perspec-
tive.
Mana magazine, with its glossy format and plenty of visual appeal, sits
between radio and the newspapers in terms of audience appeal and accessibility,
providing news and information across a wide range of issues, events and
people.  It delivers its message across iwi lines, promoting Maori images, rather
than iwi images and thus, in itself, it is a vehicle for the creation of the new Maori
nationalism.
Maori radio and nation-building
Since the demise of most of the newspapers in the mid-1990s, Maori radio has
been at the forefront of articulating Maori political aspirations in a national
public sphere. Not only is radio an audio medium working in what is regarded
(however fallaciously) as an oral culture, and therefore can be argued to be the
most culturally appropriate mass communication system, with the demise of
most Maori newspapers and Aotearoa Television Network, Maori radio has
become the dominant Maori media form.
The first radio station, Radio Ngati Porou, began broadcasting from
Ruatoria in an effort to unify the East Coast community following an outbreak
of violence centering on the local Rastafarian community.  In its attempts to
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bring the community together it was largely successful. It is still broadcasting
to Ngati Porou.
After several court battles in the late 1980s the Government funded a
network of Maori radio stations, which set the stage for the accelerated growth
of the Maori nation. Now generally referred to as iwi stations, they were set up
to preserve iwi identity in language and culture, with the runanganui holding the
licence, though sometimes delegating the broadcasting responsibility to another
organisation. This system has worked well to promote iwi identity and unity,
and uphold language dialects, using a format of music, news, talk-back and local
information, with Te Reo Maori as the dominant language of broadcasting, at
least in desire if not practise.
There are 20-odd Maori/iwi radio stations across the country, as new ones
are created and older ones drop off the system. However, generally the radio
stations are flourishing and providing a service to nearly all Maori in New
Zealand.
The Starnet network, which allows all stations to link together and allows
nationwide broadcast of news and political programmes such as talkback and
current affairs shows, was an important development. Starnet allowed the
interlinking of the stations and sped up the creation of a ‘Maori’ nation, made
up admittedly, of different iwi.  First, through the Mana News service, then the
interlinking through Starnet of interactive talk-back programmes and the all
night programmes from Radio Aotearoa, and the now widespread use of the
Ruia Mai programming service, Maori radio is proving to be a unifying force for
Maori.
Starnet and networked programming meant that the politically active voices
in Auckland and Wellington could be heard in homes such as in East Cape’s Te
Araroa and Ruatoria; Taranaki’s Bell Block; Hawke’s Bay’s Flaxmere; Porirua,
Christchurch’s Aranui, in fact, across the country. Previously these homes and
people had been isolated from national,  politically unifying debate but were
now brought into contact with Maori political voices through their radio. By
providing Maori voices nationwide, disparate and dispersed groups were able
to identify with the message of these politically active, culturally aware people.
This unifying force is creating a Maori identity, constructed by Maori,
instead of the previous Maori identity constructed by Pakeha, adopted then
rejected by Maori.
As Castells says, nations are constructed through a shared history ‘then
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spoken of in the images of communal languages whose first word is “we” whose
second word is “us” and whose third word is, unfortunately “them”.’ (Castells
1997: 52) The ‘them’ has always been Pakeha as far as Maori is concerned.  The
‘we’ was the iwi and hapu.  Maori radio is allowing Maori to construct their own
‘us’. This means the Maori media will do what has not been possible in the past,
make Maori identity a Maori construction, rather than a construction of the
colonisers and the Pakeha.
Information flows and feedback loops
Maori first turned to their own media because of the symbol it presented.  Tuning
in to a Maori station was an act of resistance. It involved actively turning off
(rejecting) Pakeha radio and turning on Maori radio. Turning off a Pakeha radio
station was a satisfying act of resistance in itself, but coupled with turning on a
Maori radio station it became a positive political action. The symbolic power of
this act of resistance to the messages of the dominant culture can not be under-
estimated.  In terms of the neo-Gramscian discourse theories it is a hegemonic
counter-practice.
And in this act of resistance listeners did get many of the messages. The
ideology expressed in the youth music, especially rap, in the news and in the
talkback and political discussions came through clearly. The Maori audience, no
longer resistant readers and made more receptive by their own act of resistance
and accompanying political act, heard the political messages of other Maori, and
thus increased their own political consciousness.
Early in the establishment of Maori radio, political discussion was at a very
basic level.  The wide-spread audience was generally not politically aware and
so did not respond to higher levels of  discourse, or to political opinions and
information for which they had neither the background information nor the
opinions to judge with.  Maori radio, (with newspapers and some television)
provided base information and opinions, which appealed to Maori, because they
were Maori opinions and information. In effect Maori radio is educating Maori
about the New Zealand political system and potential Maori action within the
system. In turn this allowed an increased level of political debate on Maori radio,
establishing a feedback loop with ever increasing levels of political debate
across the Maori airwaves and across the emerging Maori nation.
This then allowed Maori radio to present ever increasing complex and
higher levels of opinion.  Talkback radio is a good example of that because it
allows the audience to participate.  The more informed and politically aware the
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audience, the higher the level of discourse, and the higher the level of opinion
the audience is exposed to, the higher levels of debate radio is able to assimilate
and reproduce.  This is an endless cycle which includes the politicians, who use
the media to listen to the ‘voice of the people’ and design and float policies
accordingly.
In Bourdieu’s concept, political apathy arises from ‘the dispossession of the
means of production of political opinions’. (Bourdieu 1998: 4). This is a slightly
different formulation from the usual characterisations in New Zealand of Maori
political apathy arising from an alienation from the political process, or (what
amounts to the same thing) the powerlessness of the socially alienated.
It is worth pausing to consider what Bourdieu is suggesting in terms of
decision-making processes and Maori involvement in these processes. People’s
opinions are based on neutral information as well as  decision-making processes
— considering, rejecting, accepting or modifying other people’s opinions.
Generally people get their primary information and opinions from media
sources. Personal opinion may also be considered and discussed with col-
leagues, friends and family, and chosen, formulated or clarified in the discus-
sion.
Until the advent of the Maori mass media, Maori had access only to
information filtered through the Pakeha culture, to opinions about Maori
expressed by non-Maori or Maori opinions mediated and modified by Pakeha
media producers. Maori were conscious of these factors, rejected the informa-
tion as not neutral and therefore not useful. Maori also rejected Pakeha opinions
as flawed and further, rejected the Pakeha presentation of Maori opinion as too
selectively presented to be useful. Thus they largely had no information and no
opinions to work with to formulate their own individual and valid opinions.
Maori, alienated from the mainstream media, and other informational
sources and flows, were unable to formulate opinions and have them repre-
sented, or see other Maori opinions represented. More importantly, action is
based on opinion, so without opinions Maori had no basis for political action.
However the Maori media has been able to involve Maori in information flows
and expose them to a range of opinions which can be discussed within the social
and familial groups to which individuals belong, thus enabling Maori to form
opinions and then act upon those opinions.
This process need not be in explicit opposition to Pakeha opinions and
information sources, nor need it be in conjunction with Pakeha media systems.
However the reality is that in some case it is one or the other.  ‘Radical’ Maori
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opinions tend to be formulated in direct opposition to Pakeha, and accepted
expressly because they are oppositional, while more ‘moderate’ opinions are
formulated in conjunction with Pakeha opinions and accepted or rejected as
such. (The definition of politically ‘radical’ or ‘moderate’ depends on where the
person making the judgement sits on the political spectrum and so is a subjective
judgement, hence the ‘quotation marks’.)
However, the huge growth in Maori participation in politics, and particu-
larly in Maori voting patterns, is a direct result of access to the informational
flows of the Maori media, particularly Maori radio, and therefore access to the
means of production of political opinions.
The feedback loop was accelerated before the 1996 election when there was
a major push to get Maori onto the electoral roll  to increase the number of seats
in Parliament.  The campaign not only achieved its goal, it also increased Maori
political awareness. It did this by bringing the number of seats in parliament to
the fore of Maori thinking, as well as prompting a public debate on Maori
political power in the mainstream of politics. Maori radio played an important
role in this process.
Hegemonic practice and cultural identity
The two concepts of identity and political action come together in the neo-
Gramscian discourse theories of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. (Laclau
and Mouffe, 2001) In fact, within their theory, the establishment of an identity
is a political act in itself, and the re-establishment by Maori of their own identity
is a clear example because it is so overtly political in nature.  In doing so Maori
are challenging the Pakeha hegemony and engaging in their own hegemonic
practice of articulation (Torfing, 1999:  Mouffe, 1993: Laclau and Mouffe,
2001). The implications of this are discussed in the next section
It is worth pausing to look at Bourdieu’s construction of legitimate spheres
of discourse and the language appropriate to those spheres. (Bourdieu, 1991)
Maori have been shut out of Pakeha-controlled political arenas largely because
they do not use an officially sanctioned language for that arena. As well, Maori
are not usually authorised to legitimately speak in that arena. In creating a Maori
media, Maori have established their own arenas, with an official language, and
where Maori have more authorisation to speak.
Effectively, non-Maori are shut out of these arenas, unless specifically
invited to speak. What this means is that Maori have created a sphere of
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discourse where they can fully develop their identity because there is no other
fully developed group to restrict that development.
The future
These developments have huge implications for New Zealand society.
By creating their own identity and accompanying discourse, Maori may be
forcing New Zealand down the path towards Laclau and Mouffe’s radical plural
democracy, in which social antagonisms are healthy, where plurality is valued
and where conflicts are a healthy part of democracy.  In Mouffe and Laclau’s
concept, the necessary ingredients of a healthy, but radical, plural democracy
are fully developed identities that confront each other as adversaries, not
enemies. Mouffe and Laclau argue that people regard the ‘other’ as an enemy
to be beaten, but need to regard the ‘other’: as adversaries to be challenged and
who challenge the ‘us’.
The first results are already obvious as the discursive limits of the public
discourse, limited by the social antagonism of non-Maori New Zealand towards
Maori, are expanding to include Maori views. The social antagonisms are still
evident, such as in the recent stories of the taniwha who apparently held up the
rerouting of state highway one and added millions of dollars to the project’s cost
and the taniwha who impeded the new prison at Nga Wha. However there are
also stories that attempt to explain Maori values and beliefs to non-Maori. Such
stories do not present these views as not to be taken seriously, as the majority
of news reporting does. As well Maori are taking a larger role in the New
Zealand wide discourse, partly aided by the number of Maori in Parliament and
other major political roles.
But the development of a Maori identity, and the consequent development
of a Maori nation within the state of New Zealand will provide a case study of
Laclau and Mouffe’s radical democratic theories with a range of questions such
as: will the theories work in practice; how do they operate in real situations; what
are the positives and negatives, impediments and benefits; how do two fully
developed identities related to each other within the same society?
This final question is the most important one for the future of New Zealand
society and one which needs to be resolved if New Zealand is to grow into its
own myth of a society with good race relations. It is important if New Zealand
is to have a true bicultural society, and then a multi-cultural society.
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